that one above is the mini dump and this is the memory.dmp file
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\MEMORY.DMP]
Kernel Summary Dump File: Only kernel address space is available
Symbol search path is: SRV*c:\symbols*
Symbol information
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (2 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS
Built by: 7600.16539.amd64fre.win7_gdr.100226-1909
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`02a18000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02c55e50
Debug session time: Wed Jun 23 18:14:51.760 2010 (UTC + 1:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 0:06:39.742
Loading Kernel Symbols
...............................................................
................................................................
......................
Loading User Symbols
PEB is paged out (Peb.Ldr = 00000000`7efdf018). Type ".hh dbgerr001" for details
Loading unloaded module list
....
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Bugcheck Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.
BugCheck F7, {180c5948a90, 24f12c4c4b5d, ffffdb0ed3b3b4a2, 0}
Page 1a2c7 not present in the dump file. Type ".hh dbgerr004" for details
Probably caused by : hardware ( win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+28 )
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
1: kd> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Bugcheck Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
DRIVER_OVERRAN_STACK_BUFFER (f7)
A driver has overrun a stack-based buffer. This overrun could potentially
allow a malicious user to gain control of this machine.
DESCRIPTION
A driver overran a stack-based buffer (or local variable) in a way that would
have overwritten the function's return address and jumped back to an arbitrary
address when the function returned. This is the classic "buffer overrun"
hacking attack and the system has been brought down to prevent a malicious user
from gaining complete control of it.
Do a kb to get a stack backtrace -- the last routine on the stack before the
buffer overrun handlers and bugcheck call is the one that overran its local
variable(s).
Arguments:
Arg1: 00000180c5948a90, Actual security check cookie from the stack
Arg2: 000024f12c4c4b5d, Expected security check cookie
Arg3: ffffdb0ed3b3b4a2, Complement of the expected security check cookie
Arg4: 0000000000000000, zero
Debugging Details:
------------------
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: GS_FALSE_POSITIVE_MISSING_GSFRAME
SECURITY_COOKIE: Expected 000024f12c4c4b5d found 00000180c5948a90
BUGCHECK_STR: 0xF7
PROCESS_NAME: firefox.exe
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
EXCEPTION_RECORD: fffff880073dbaa8 -- (.exr 0xfffff880073dbaa8)
ExceptionAddress: fffff80002a8e411 (nt!SepAccessCheck+0x0000000000000501)
ExceptionCode: c000001d (Illegal instruction)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 0
TRAP_FRAME: fffff880073dbb50 -- (.trap 0xfffff880073dbb50)
NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
rax=fffff880073dbde0 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=fffffa800440c060
rdx=fffffa8004b52b60 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=fffff80002a8e411 rsp=fffff880073dbce0 rbp=fffffa800440c060
r8=fffffa800440c100 r9=000000000000000e r10=0000000000000000
r11=fffff880009e4180 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0 nv dn ei ng nz na pe nc
nt!SepAccessCheck+0x501:
fffff800`02a8e411 ff ???
Resetting default scope
MISALIGNED_IP:
nt!SepAccessCheck+501
fffff800`02a8e411 ff ???
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002b1d405 to fffff80002a88600
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`073dab58 fffff800`02b1d405 : 00000000`000000f7 00000180`c5948a90 000024f1`2c4c4b5d ffffdb0e`d3b3b4a2 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`073dab60 fffff800`02ad72f7 : 0000f0f0`0000000a fffff960`000e0082 fffff880`073db310 fffff800`02ab5524 : nt!_report_gsfailure+0x25
fffff880`073daba0 fffff800`02aae2ed : 00000000`0010001f fffff880`073db310 fffff880`073dbb50 fffff880`073dbaa8 : nt!_GSHandlerCheck+0x13
fffff880`073dabd0 fffff800`02ab5950 : fffff800`02bd211c fffff880`073dac48 fffff880`073dbaa8 fffff800`02a18000 : nt!RtlpExecuteHandlerForException+0xd
fffff880`073dac00 fffff800`02ac28df : fffff880`073dbaa8 fffff880`073db310 fffff880`00000000 fffff880`009e4180 : nt!RtlDispatchException+0x410
fffff880`073db2e0 fffff800`02a87c42 : fffff880`073dbaa8 fffffa80`0440c060 fffff880`073dbb50 fffffa80`04b52b60 : nt!KiDispatchException+0x16f
fffff880`073db970 fffff800`02a85d9f : fffff880`073dbb50 fffff900`c0218f02 fffff900`c0218f00 fffff800`00000000 : nt!KiExceptionDispatch+0xc2
fffff880`073dbb50 fffff800`02a8e411 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiInvalidOpcodeFault+0x11f
fffff880`073dbce0 00000001`00000000 : fffff880`009e4180 fffff800`02a3f304 fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 : nt!SepAccessCheck+0x501
fffff880`073dbe10 fffff880`009e4180 : fffff800`02a3f304 fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 00000000`00000000 : 0x1`00000000
fffff880`073dbe18 fffff800`02a3f304 : fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 00000000`00000000 fffff880`073dbe90 : 0xfffff880`009e4180
fffff880`073dbe20 fffff800`02a8e592 : 00000000`0000000f fffff880`009e4180 fffff880`073dbf10 fffff880`073dc110 : nt!KiQuantumEnd+0x1b4
fffff880`073dbe60 fffff800`02ad39dc : fffffa80`01befd70 fffff880`009e4180 00000000`00000000 fffff880`009e4180 : nt!KiDispatchInterruptContinue+0x16
fffff880`073dbe90 fffff800`02a91411 : 00000000`00000000 fffff900`000e0082 fffff960`002ebaa8 fffff960`002ebac8 : nt!KiDpcInterrupt+0xcc
fffff880`073dc020 fffff960`00273858 : fffff900`00000000 fffff960`00000001 fffff880`073dc190 fffff960`000f2900 : nt!KeReleaseMutant+0x151
fffff880`073dc0d0 fffff960`000c6bdf : fffff900`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`000000c8 00000000`000000d8 : win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+0x28
fffff880`073dc100 fffff960`00104705 : fffff900`c00bf010 fffff960`00223309 fffff880`073dc288 00000141`000000d1 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::vFlushSpriteUpdates+0x13f
fffff880`073dc150 fffff960`001045d6 : fffff880`073dc288 fffff880`073dc390 00000000`00000000 fffff880`00000001 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::bDisposeTrgDco+0x61
fffff880`073dc180 fffff960`0005f561 : fffff900`c3fbf630 00000000`00000000 fffff880`073dc390 fffff900`c0000340 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::~DEVLOCKOBJ+0xe
fffff880`073dc1b0 fffff960`00232ce8 : fffff880`073dc390 000007ff`fffdd000 00000000`0013ee58 fffff960`ffffffff : win32k!GrePolyPatBltInternal+0x3e1
fffff880`073dc300 fffff800`02a87853 : 00000000`0013edc8 fffff880`00f00021 00000000`0013ee40 fffff880`00000001 : win32k!NtGdiPolyPatBlt+0x308
fffff880`073dc430 000007fe`fefd15da : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13
00000000`0013eda8 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : 0x7fe`fefd15da
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+28
fffff960`00273858 b801000000 mov eax,1
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: f
SYMBOL_NAME: win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+28
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
IMAGE_NAME: hardware
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 0
MODULE_NAME: hardware
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_IP_MISALIGNED
BUCKET_ID: X64_IP_MISALIGNED
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
1: kd> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Bugcheck Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
DRIVER_OVERRAN_STACK_BUFFER (f7)
A driver has overrun a stack-based buffer. This overrun could potentially
allow a malicious user to gain control of this machine.
DESCRIPTION
A driver overran a stack-based buffer (or local variable) in a way that would
have overwritten the function's return address and jumped back to an arbitrary
address when the function returned. This is the classic "buffer overrun"
hacking attack and the system has been brought down to prevent a malicious user
from gaining complete control of it.
Do a kb to get a stack backtrace -- the last routine on the stack before the
buffer overrun handlers and bugcheck call is the one that overran its local
variable(s).
Arguments:
Arg1: 00000180c5948a90, Actual security check cookie from the stack
Arg2: 000024f12c4c4b5d, Expected security check cookie
Arg3: ffffdb0ed3b3b4a2, Complement of the expected security check cookie
Arg4: 0000000000000000, zero
Debugging Details:
------------------
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: GS_FALSE_POSITIVE_MISSING_GSFRAME
SECURITY_COOKIE: Expected 000024f12c4c4b5d found 00000180c5948a90
BUGCHECK_STR: 0xF7
PROCESS_NAME: firefox.exe
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
EXCEPTION_RECORD: fffff880073dbaa8 -- (.exr 0xfffff880073dbaa8)
ExceptionAddress: fffff80002a8e411 (nt!SepAccessCheck+0x0000000000000501)
ExceptionCode: c000001d (Illegal instruction)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 0
TRAP_FRAME: fffff880073dbb50 -- (.trap 0xfffff880073dbb50)
NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
rax=fffff880073dbde0 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=fffffa800440c060
rdx=fffffa8004b52b60 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=fffff80002a8e411 rsp=fffff880073dbce0 rbp=fffffa800440c060
r8=fffffa800440c100 r9=000000000000000e r10=0000000000000000
r11=fffff880009e4180 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0 nv dn ei ng nz na pe nc
nt!SepAccessCheck+0x501:
fffff800`02a8e411 ff ???
Resetting default scope
MISALIGNED_IP:
nt!SepAccessCheck+501
fffff800`02a8e411 ff ???
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002b1d405 to fffff80002a88600
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`073dab58 fffff800`02b1d405 : 00000000`000000f7 00000180`c5948a90 000024f1`2c4c4b5d ffffdb0e`d3b3b4a2 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`073dab60 fffff800`02ad72f7 : 0000f0f0`0000000a fffff960`000e0082 fffff880`073db310 fffff800`02ab5524 : nt!_report_gsfailure+0x25
fffff880`073daba0 fffff800`02aae2ed : 00000000`0010001f fffff880`073db310 fffff880`073dbb50 fffff880`073dbaa8 : nt!_GSHandlerCheck+0x13
fffff880`073dabd0 fffff800`02ab5950 : fffff800`02bd211c fffff880`073dac48 fffff880`073dbaa8 fffff800`02a18000 : nt!RtlpExecuteHandlerForException+0xd
fffff880`073dac00 fffff800`02ac28df : fffff880`073dbaa8 fffff880`073db310 fffff880`00000000 fffff880`009e4180 : nt!RtlDispatchException+0x410
fffff880`073db2e0 fffff800`02a87c42 : fffff880`073dbaa8 fffffa80`0440c060 fffff880`073dbb50 fffffa80`04b52b60 : nt!KiDispatchException+0x16f
fffff880`073db970 fffff800`02a85d9f : fffff880`073dbb50 fffff900`c0218f02 fffff900`c0218f00 fffff800`00000000 : nt!KiExceptionDispatch+0xc2
fffff880`073dbb50 fffff800`02a8e411 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiInvalidOpcodeFault+0x11f
fffff880`073dbce0 00000001`00000000 : fffff880`009e4180 fffff800`02a3f304 fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 : nt!SepAccessCheck+0x501
fffff880`073dbe10 fffff880`009e4180 : fffff800`02a3f304 fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 00000000`00000000 : 0x1`00000000
fffff880`073dbe18 fffff800`02a3f304 : fffffa80`0440c060 fffffa80`04b52b60 00000000`00000000 fffff880`073dbe90 : 0xfffff880`009e4180
fffff880`073dbe20 fffff800`02a8e592 : 00000000`0000000f fffff880`009e4180 fffff880`073dbf10 fffff880`073dc110 : nt!KiQuantumEnd+0x1b4
fffff880`073dbe60 fffff800`02ad39dc : fffffa80`01befd70 fffff880`009e4180 00000000`00000000 fffff880`009e4180 : nt!KiDispatchInterruptContinue+0x16
fffff880`073dbe90 fffff800`02a91411 : 00000000`00000000 fffff900`000e0082 fffff960`002ebaa8 fffff960`002ebac8 : nt!KiDpcInterrupt+0xcc
fffff880`073dc020 fffff960`00273858 : fffff900`00000000 fffff960`00000001 fffff880`073dc190 fffff960`000f2900 : nt!KeReleaseMutant+0x151
fffff880`073dc0d0 fffff960`000c6bdf : fffff900`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`000000c8 00000000`000000d8 : win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+0x28
fffff880`073dc100 fffff960`00104705 : fffff900`c00bf010 fffff960`00223309 fffff880`073dc288 00000141`000000d1 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::vFlushSpriteUpdates+0x13f
fffff880`073dc150 fffff960`001045d6 : fffff880`073dc288 fffff880`073dc390 00000000`00000000 fffff880`00000001 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::bDisposeTrgDco+0x61
fffff880`073dc180 fffff960`0005f561 : fffff900`c3fbf630 00000000`00000000 fffff880`073dc390 fffff900`c0000340 : win32k!DEVLOCKOBJ::~DEVLOCKOBJ+0xe
fffff880`073dc1b0 fffff960`00232ce8 : fffff880`073dc390 000007ff`fffdd000 00000000`0013ee58 fffff960`ffffffff : win32k!GrePolyPatBltInternal+0x3e1
fffff880`073dc300 fffff800`02a87853 : 00000000`0013edc8 fffff880`00f00021 00000000`0013ee40 fffff880`00000001 : win32k!NtGdiPolyPatBlt+0x308
fffff880`073dc430 000007fe`fefd15da : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13
00000000`0013eda8 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : 0x7fe`fefd15da
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+28
fffff960`00273858 b801000000 mov eax,1
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: f
SYMBOL_NAME: win32k!SURFACE::bUnMap+28
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
IMAGE_NAME: hardware
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 0
MODULE_NAME: hardware
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_IP_MISALIGNED
BUCKET_ID: X64_IP_MISALIGNED
Followup: MachineOwner
---------